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Access, Progress, and Fairness: 
Rethinking Exclusivity in Copyright 
Nicolas Suzor* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article provides a detailed critique of the incentives-access 
binary in copyright discourse. Mainstream copyright theory generally 
accepts that copyright is a balance between providing incentives to 
authors to invest in the production of cultural works and enhancing the 
dissemination of those works to the public. This Article argues that 
dominant copyright theory obscures the possibility of developing a 
model of copyright that is able to support authors without necessarily 
limiting access to creative works. The abundance that the Internet 
allows suggests that increasing access to cultural works to enhance 
learning, sharing, and creative play should be a fundamental goal of 
copyright policy. 
This Article examines models of supporting and coordinating 
cultural production without exclusivity, including crowdfunding, tips, 
levies, restitution, and service-based models. In their current forms, 
each of these models fails to provide a cohesive and convincing vision of 
the two main functions of copyright: instrumentality (how cultural 
production can be funded) and fairness (how authors can be 
adequately rewarded). This Article provides three avenues for future 
research to investigate the viability of alternate copyright models: (1) a 
better theory of fairness in copyright rewards; (2) more empirical study 
of commons models of cultural production; and (3) a critical 
examination of the noneconomic harm-limiting function that 
exclusivity in copyright provides. 
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In an age of cheap digital distribution, radical copyright 
critiques have emerged that challenge the basic assumptions of 
copyright law.  The standard justification for copyright is that it is a 
utilitarian balance between providing incentives to the creative 
industries1 to invest in cultural production on the one hand, and 
encouraging access to and use of those works on the other.  Copyright 
does this by providing exclusive rights over expression in order to 
allow copyright owners to recoup their costs of production.  Radical 
critiques, which this Article calls “abundance models,” challenge this 
 
 1.  See generally STUART CUNNINGHAM, WHAT PRICE A CREATIVE ECONOMY? 1-50 (2006) 
(discussing the term “creative industries”). 
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standard justification by envisaging models of copyright not rooted in 
scarcity of copyrighted goods.  These models instead suggest methods 
of funding cultural production of creative works through public levy 
systems;2 business models based on services, cross-subsidies, and 
advertising;3 tips and crowdfunding agreements;4 and profit-sharing 
obligations on commercial users.5 
These models generally fall outside of the mainstream 
copyright-reform debate, whose bounds are set by utilitarianism and 
authors-rights theories, the two main theories underlying copyright 
law.6  This Article argues that the dichotomous opposition of these two 
theories masks a deeply ingrained assumption in copyright law that is 
common to both: exclusivity is necessary to provide the incentives and 
rewards to authors that “Progress”7 requires.  Exclusivity creates a 
market that satisfies both theoretical approaches by (1) incentivizing 
authors and producers to invest in the most valuable cultural 
production and (2) rewarding authors in proportion to the worth of 
their work.  Importantly, copyright is not ideologically pure.8 An 
exclusive market fulfills both instrumental and deontological 
functions by equating incentives with fair rewards.9  The abundance 
models have not found normative support in part because they break 
the link between incentives and rewards. 
The Internet’s potential to reconfigure established modes of 
production and distribution raises questions about the assumed 
necessity of exclusivity.  To challenge this assumption, this Article 
proposes viewing creativity as ordinary and abundant and 
emphasizing the importance of access to creative expression in order 
to enable individuals to learn, grow, share, and engage in creative 
 
 2.  See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP 199-258 (2004); Peter 
Eckersley, Virtual Markets for Virtual Goods: The Mirror Image of Digital Copyright?, 18 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 85, 92-94 (2004); Neil W. Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free 
Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 80-83 (2003). 
 3.  See, e.g., CHRIS ANDERSON, FREE: THE FUTURE OF A RADICAL PRICE 20-33 (2009). 
 4.  See Paul Harrison, The Rational Street Performer Protocol, PAUL HARRISON, 
http://www.logarithmic.net/pfh/rspp (last updated Nov. 25, 2002); John Kelsey & Bruce Schneier, 
The Street Performer Protocol and Digital Copyrights, FIRST MONDAY (June 1999), http://www. 
firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/673/583; Chris Rasch, The Wall 
Street Performer Protocol: Using Software Completion Bonds to Fund Open Source Software 
Development, FIRST MONDAY (June 4, 2001), http://www.firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/ 
index.php/fm/article/view/865/774. 
 5.  See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the 
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 260-61 (1992). 
 6.  Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1151, 1158 (2007). 
 7.  U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 8.  See Cohen, supra note 6, at 1154-55. 
 9.  Id. at 1158. 
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play.10  Prioritizing access provides a starting point to investigate 
whether and how society can realize copyright’s instrumental and 
deontological functions without exclusivity.  If creativity really is 
abundant, then a copyright model that supports cultural production 
without necessarily limiting access could represent a more efficient, 
more distributively fair, more empowering, and more innovative 
culture than the zero-sum view of culture entrenched in the 
incentives-access paradigm.11 
To consider potential alternatives to exclusivity, this Article 
moves beyond the opposition of utilitarian and authors’ rights 
theories.  More critically examining the claims of each is necessary in 
order to better understand how to economically support cultural 
production and simultaneously reward authors fairly.  This Article 
outlines some of the weaknesses of current abundance models in 
copyright in order to uncover the theoretical tensions that constrain 
their development. 
First, proponents of abundance models need to develop a better 
theory of fairness in order to understand the rewards to which 
creative producers are morally entitled.  If abundance models are to 
gain normative acceptance, proponents must build consensus as to 
when uncompensated access, or free riding, is unfair.  Separating 
fairness from efficiency is important in order to identify when 
uncompensated access can be appropriate, and when either exclusivity 
or an obligation to pay for access may be necessary to prevent 
exploitation of authors. 
Second, scholars should conduct more empirical research to 
examine the extent to which abundance models are practically feasible 
across various creative industries.  Classical economic theory explains 
that copyright is necessary to induce consumers to pay for access to 
expressive works, but many non-scarce models rely on the voluntary 
financial support of consumers.  A new research model should 
investigate the factors that influence actors to support creative 
production beyond exclusivity and whether that level of support could 
sufficiently fund a diverse range of productions at varying degrees of 
expense.  This Article suggests that viewing these models as 
collaborative action problems will assist in building an empirical base 
for understanding cultural-production processes that do not rely on 
public provision or the exclusive market.12 
 
 10.  See id. at 1154, 1190-205 (articulating a model of progress based on decentering 
creativity). 
 11.  See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 
VAND. L. REV. 483, 492-98 (1996) (describing the “incentives-access paradigm”). 
 12.  See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 25 (1990); Michael J. Madison et al., Constructing Commons in the 
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Third, any new model must appropriately deal with the other 
interests that copyright currently supports, beyond the instrumental 
goal of encouraging “Progress.”  The most obvious of these are the 
moral rights of creators, which are currently partially protected by 
copyright’s exclusive rights in the United States.13  Copyright owners 
can also use (and misuse) copyright to protect other interests, 
however, including reputation and privacy.  Abundance models that 
aim to reduce exclusivity must determine whether protection for these 
other interests of authors and copyright owners should accordingly 
increase.  The first step in this process requires developing a better 
understanding of whether these noneconomic harms are wholly 
subjective and heterogeneous, such that only exclusivity can protect 
them, or whether they are adequately protectable through other 
means. 
Part I of this Article examines how the orthodox justifications 
for copyright work to entrench the incentives-access paradigm in a 
way that systematically prefers incentives to access.  Part II draws on 
the recent literature to sketch a reconstituted view of progress that 
emphasizes the importance of access for knowledge, entertainment, 
self-expression, and cultural play.  In Parts III-VI, this Article 
explores these three initial research avenues in order to more fully 
understand the viability of potential abundance models for copyright. 
I. THE ENTRENCHED INCENTIVES-ACCESS PARADIGM 
The current copyright debate revolves around the fundamental, 
but assumed, necessity of exclusivity in copyright law.  The major 
copyright struggle centers on the widening gap between doctrine and 
social norms concerning copying.14  Both sides of the mainstream 
 
Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657, 675-96 (2010) (adopting the Institutional 
Analysis and Development framework for cultural production processes). 
 13.  ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS 
LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 30-35 (2010). 
 14.  WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 109 (2009); see Jane C. 
Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 61, 61 (2002) 
(arguing that “greed,” of both copyright owners and consumers, has directly contributed to the 
poor public perception of copyright law); Paul Goldstein, Copyright’s Commons, 29 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 1, 2 (2005) (arguing that the public perception of copyright as “a juggernaut . . . [that] is 
crushing cherished creative and expressive freedoms” must be rejected and addressed through 
public education); Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 15 (2010) 
(“Copyright laws that make reading, listening, and viewing more difficult are problematic . . . [in 
part because] the sheer pointlessness of some of these restraints has undermined the perceived 
legitimacy of the U.S. copyright system.”); John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright 
Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 538 (discussing “the vast disparity 
between copyright law and copyright norms”); Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with the Intellectual 
Property Laws: A Psychological Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 219, 224 (1996) (“The 
effectiveness of intellectual property law is . . . heavily dependent on gaining voluntary 
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debate agree that reform is necessary to restore public faith in 
copyright, but disagree on the means.  Copyright industry groups 
attempt to educate consumers that piracy is morally wrong and push 
for stronger rights, more distributed enforcement, and more pervasive 
information control.15  More moderate copyright commentators, on the 
other hand, converge on two points: (1) Congress should curtail the 
most egregious effects of copyright law to provide a better balance 
between the rights of users and owners and greatly simplify the law to 
make it more understandable;16 and (2) business models should 
continue to evolve to provide consumers with a simpler and more 
efficient alternative to infringement.17  Because both sides share the 
assumption that exclusivity is necessary, the debate marginalizes the 
promise that abundance models provide. 
A. The Mainstream Copyright Debate 
The two most visible sides to the debate agree on one central 
point: copyright law must provide a balance between the rights 
granted to authors and producers and the public’s interest in 
accessing expressive works.18  As copyright reform movements begin 
to converge, the best we can aim for under a copyright theory that 
relies on a dichotomy between incentives and access is to develop a 
system that is “leaky” enough to mitigate the most harmful effects of 
scarcity, yet strong enough to encourage producers to invest in 
 
cooperation with the law. As a result, it is necessary to influence what people want to do in 
situations in which there is little or no threat of immediate punishment for wrongdoing.” 
(emphasis added)); Francis Gurry, Dir. Gen., World Intellectual Prop. Org., The Blue Sky 
Conference: Future Directions in Copyright Law (Feb. 25, 2011), in http://www.wipo.int/about-
wipo/en/dgo/speeches/dg_blueskyconf_11.html (arguing that it is necessary to “effect a change in 
attitude” to the way that “that most people see or hear about copyright and the Internet”). 
 15.  See PATRY, supra note 14, at 94-96; Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively Distributed 
Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. L.J. 1, 18 (2006) (“Entertainment industry representatives have 
deployed a variety of rhetorical tropes designed to position online copyright infringement, and 
particularly p2p filesharing, as morally objectionable and socially insidious.”). 
 16.  See Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 
51-52 (1994); Real Copyright Reform, supra note 14, at 33-34 (arguing that there is “no excuse” 
for the complexity of copyright law); Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: 
Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1176, 1181 (2010) (“A well-functioning 
copyright law carefully balances the interests of the public [and] . . . copyright 
owners . . . [and] . . . should embody rules that are clear and sensible, yet flexible enough to apply 
in a changing environment.”). 
 17.  See Joe Karaganis, Rethinking Piracy, in MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 1, 
66 (Joe Karaganis ed., 2011) (quoting an industry representative as saying industries will 
“isolate the forms of piracy that compete with legitimate sales, treat those as a proxy for unmet 
consumer demand, and then find a way to meet that demand” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 18.  See Netanel, supra note 2, at 24. 
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copyright products.19  This debate leaves the core assumption—that 
copyright is a balance between providing incentives to authors and the 
interests of the public at large—mostly unexamined.20 
The orthodox view of copyright in Anglo-American discourse is 
that copyright provides the incentives necessary to encourage authors 
to create.21  Copyright, under this view, is a necessary evil, a finely 
tuned balance between providing incentives to create and encouraging 
dissemination of, and access to, copyright works.22  This balance, 
however, is fundamentally indeterminate—it is unclear what balance 
between incentives and access is optimal.23  There is also deep 
uncertainty at the root of the utilitarian equation as to whether it 
makes sense to talk about incentives for creative labor at all; it is 
becoming increasingly clear that the financial rewards copyright 
provides may have very little role in stimulating creativity.24  Recent 
 
 19.  SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 184 (2001) (arguing that “a leaky copyright 
system works best”); see Brett M. Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright 
Law, 3 REV. L. & ECON. 649, 673 (2007) (“To best serve its economic and social objectives (to 
promote Progress, broadly conceived), copyright must be somewhat but not completely leaky.”); 
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 910 (2001) (“Even if some free riding slips 
by, in the guise of civil disobedience or otherwise, the empirical evidence suggests that voluntary 
compliance will likely prove sufficient to achieve a fair and efficient level of effective 
protection.”). 
 20.  This assumption is furthered by:  
[C]reating the appearance of controversy, the struggle between maximalists and 
minimalists sustains the underlying hegemony of the instrumentalist paradigm. As 
much as maximalists, minimalists deploy the concept of copyright as a way of 
providing incentives for creativity. The debate is not about the appropriateness of that 
concept but about the way in which it should be operationalized. 
Abraham Drassinower, A Note on Incentives, Rights, and the Public Domain in Copyright Law, 
86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1869, 1872 (2011). 
 21.  See Real Copyright Reform, supra note 14, at 8-9. 
 22.  CHARLES ROBERT GASTON, MACAULAY’S SPEECHES ON COPYRIGHT AND LINCOLN’S 
ADDRESS AT COOPER UNION 25 (1914) (reprinting Lord Macaulay’s famous point that copyright 
“is a tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers”); William M. Landes & Richard 
A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989). 
 23.  ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2-3 (2011); Mark A. 
Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1065-69 (2005); 
David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism, 69 MO. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2004); Ivan P.L. Png, 
Copyright: A Plea for Empirical Research, 3 REV. ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 3, 4 (2006) 
(arguing that insufficient empirical research exists on the appropriate balance in copyright law); 
Ruth Towse et al., The Economics of Copyright Law: A Stocktake of the Literature, 5 REV. ECON. 
RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 1, 15-16 (2008) (“There is nothing in all the literature we surveyed 
here to guide us towards the ‘optimal’ copyright standard.”). 
 24.  BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 75 (1967) (“[C]opyright has 
evidently more to do today with mobilizing the profit-propelled apparatus of  
dissemination—publication and distribution—than with calling the signals into first 
unpublished existence; the latter process must be to a considerable extent self-generated.”); Julie 
E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research Agenda, 2011 WIS. 
L. REV. 141, 143; Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine 
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critical examinations of creative processes highlight the importance of 
compulsion, inspiration, serendipity, need, and desire, rather than 
copyright or even financial gain, as key motivating factors for most 
creative labor.25  At the same time, the lottery that copyright provides, 
rewarding an extremely small proportion of artists highly, suggests 
that copyright creates severe distributional problems and has serious 
failures in its inability, in practical terms, to provide the financial 
support that professional creators need to pursue their craft.26  
Certainly, copyright has a very real instrumental function in 
allocating capital: facilitating the coordination of expensive cultural 
production and the selection, marketing, distribution, and 
maintenance of works.  But these functions may be substantially more 
limited than the standard incentives-access paradigm holds.27 
B. The Entrenchment of Exclusivity 
The fundamental validity of the incentives-access dichotomy 
has “ascended to the status of an article of faith in the absence of any 
empirical validation.”28  This assumption that “progress” is best 
furthered by exclusivity and a functioning market is firmly embedded 
 
That?, 12 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 29, 42-48 (2011); see Keith Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic 
Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with Special Reference to Coercion, Agency, and 
Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 800 (2006); Jonathan M. Barnett, Is Intellectual 
Property Trivial?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1691, 1722 (2009); Eben Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant: 
Free Software and the Death of Copyright, FIRST MONDAY (Aug. 2, 1999), 
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/ view Article/684/594; Raymond 
Shih Ray Ku et al., Does Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An Empirical Analysis of 
Copyright’s Bounty, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1669, 1719 (2009); Jessica Silbey, Harvesting Intellectual 
Property: Inspired Beginnings and “Work-Makes-Work,” Two Stages in the Creative Processes of 
Artists and Innovators, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2091, 2113 (2011); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric 
and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197 (1996). 
 25.  Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 
1483 (2010); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of 
the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1970 (2005); Silbey, supra note 24, at 2102; 
Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 513, 522-36 (2009). 
 26.  RUTH TOWSE, CREATIVITY, INCENTIVE, AND REWARD: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
COPYRIGHT AND CULTURE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 132-36 (2001) (arguing that copyright 
supports an asymmetry in market power between professional artists and publisher 
intermediaries and generally fails to adequately reward all but superstar artists). The problem is 
exacerbated because the likelihood of success in the market is unpredictable at best. See 
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Blues Lives: Promise and Perils of Musical Copyright, 27 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J. 573, 616 (2010); Derek E. Bambauer, Faulty Math: The Economics of Legalizing The 
Grey Album, 59 ALA. L. REV. 345, 383-84 (2008); Litman, supra note 14, at 9-10; Tushnet, supra 
note 25, at 518; Zimmerman, supra note 24, at 41. 
 27.  See Cohen, supra note 24, at 153-56. 
 28.  Litman, supra note 14, at 29. 
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in the constitutional justification for copyright.29  Given the 
indeterminacy of the utilitarian thesis, however, particularly in the 
context of great technological advances that substantially lower 
creation and distribution costs, its continuing uncritical acceptance 
should be surprising.30  Partly, this is due to inertia—given copyright’s 
entrenched foundation, it is difficult to see any real alternatives.31  
The political strength of copyright industries supports this inertia, as 
the industries have successfully argued that a copyright policy that is 
best for the publishers and producers must be best for both authors 
and the public.32  In part, however, rights-based theoretical 
justifications also supplement this faith in the incentives-access 
dichotomy, because while they are often officially disclaimed,  
rights-based theories provide a natural justification to authors’ 
exclusive rights through the labor or personality of the author.33 
Rights-based theories rely on a deontological proposition that 
interfering with a creator’s plans for the object of her labor or creative 
 
 29.  Margaret Chon, Postmodern “Progress”: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent 
Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 98 (1993) (“[B]ecause of the instrumental tone of the Copyright 
and Patent Clause (‘to promote the Progress . . . by securing’), no one truly disputes that such 
‘Progress’ is to be encouraged through the frankly instrumental use of laws.” (emphasis added)). 
 30.  See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the 
New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 305-07 (2002); Paul Romer, When 
Should We Use Intellectual Property Rights?, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 213, 215 (2002) (explaining that 
because digital copies have an extremely low marginal cost, copyright has the effect of imposing 
an extremely large commodity tax, which is unlikely to be efficient). 
 31.  See the often-quoted passage from a review of the US patent system: 
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our 
present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But 
since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the 
basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it. 
FRITZ MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 80 (1958). 
 32.  See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 35-70 (2006) (explaining that entrenched 
power and political compromise, rather than theory, predominantly shape copyright legislation); 
L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY F. BIRCH, JR., A UNIFIED THEORY OF COPYRIGHT 381-82 (Craig 
Joyce ed., 2009); see also BENEDICT ATKINSON, THE TRUE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT: THE 
AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE 1905-2005 (2007) (arguing that the development of copyright law in 
Britain and Australia was based more on natural rights theory and sectional interests than 
orthodoxical utilitarian balancing); Sterk, supra note 24, at 1244-46. 
 33.  MERGES, supra note 23, at 9-10; Bambauer, supra note 26, at 353-54; McGowan, 
supra note 23, at 36-38; Jean-Luc Piotraut, Author’s Rights-Based Copyright Law: The Fairness 
and Morality of French and American Law Compared, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 549, 556-57 
(2006) (“[B]oth natural law principles and economic policy decisions motivated copyright law 
development in the United States. . . . Decidedly, authors’ personal claims as well as an economic 
argument underlay both French and American copyright laws.” (emphasis added)). Samuelson 
notes that: 
[M]any members of the public, and certainly most creators, are likely to have a dose of 
“natural rights” theory in their perception about copyright law, under which authors 
would have at least some control over the use of their works even if the use is  
non-commercial―and especially when the use is commercial. 
Samuelson, supra note 16, at 1213. 
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expression can cause her intrinsic harm.34  While rights-based 
arguments have strong internal limits that ensure that third parties 
have sufficient autonomy to create, the complexities of these limits are 
often lost in mainstream copyright discourse.35  It follows, for common 
authors-rights arguments, that authors are morally entitled to an 
exclusive property right over their creations to prevent the harm that 
occurs from nonconsensual interference with expression. 
Since copyright doctrine in practice is not wholly utilitarian or 
wholly rights-based,36 the opposition of these two approaches provides 
fertile grounds for arguments about the proper scope of copyright law.  
Although the utilitarian and natural-rights justifications for copyright 
are maintained in opposition, requiring exclusive property rights in 
expression produces a result that is more or less acceptable to both.  
Despite fundamental differences between the two approaches, their 
mutual support for exclusive rights can be read either as a utilitarian 
attempt to provide necessary incentives to creators, or as a recognition 
of the rights of creators to the fruits of their labor or the 
manifestations of their personal expression.37  While the differences 
matter at the margins—and they matter a great deal—they do not 
matter for maintaining exclusivity, the core function of copyright.38  
That core of exclusivity has accordingly become deeply entrenched. 
C. The Process-Based Approach to “Progress” 
Each of the orthodox arguments for exclusivity applies mainly 
to particular subsets of the subject matter protected by copyright law.  
Strictly speaking, economic approaches should not support exclusivity 
for authors who would create without it.39  The two predominant 
natural rights justifications are similarly limited, for different 
reasons.  Lockean approaches commit to a conception of creative labor 
as difficult and painful toil,40 which suggests that copyright should 
 
 34.  See, e.g., MERGES, supra note 23, at 9-10. 
 35.  Drassinower, supra note 20, at 1871 (arguing that we should further examine “the 
as yet largely unexplored potential of a rights-based minimalism”); see HUGH BREAKEY, 
INTELLECTUAL LIBERTY (forthcoming 2012). 
 36.  See McGowan, supra note 23, at 11. 
 37.  For the utilitarian perspective, see James A.D. White, Misuse or Fair Use: That is 
the Software Copyright Question, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 251, 255-56 (1997). For the natural 
justification, see Gordon, supra note 5, at 208-09. 
 38.  Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in the Future, 3 
J.L. & TECH. 1, 59-60 (1988). 
 39.  Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 31-32 
(2004). 
 40.  Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 302-05 
(1988); cf. Tushnet, supra note 25, at 525 (“Contrary to the Lockean vision of difficult labor, 
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only reward production that is either labor-intensive or undertaken 
with the expectation of reward.41  Personality theories, on the other 
hand, protect only original works that embody the creative expression 
of the author and to which the author feels a special connection, 
rather than the more prosaic and fungible works that make up a large 
proportion of copyright subject matter.42 
It would seem absurd for copyright law to actually attempt to 
draw such distinctions in practice.  Despite utilitarian and Lockean 
theories, it would appear grossly unfair to allow exclusive rights only 
for laborious economic production and not to the authors who create 
out of passion or desire.43  Similarly, regarding the personality 
theories, it seems dangerously subjective to inquire whether an author 
felt a particularly close bond to her work before awarding her some 
form of exclusive control.  It is only by reading all three of these 
approaches together that copyright theory arrives at a fundamental 
justification for exclusivity. 
In order to avoid actually having to draw these distinctions in 
doctrine, copyright takes a process-based approach that equates 
incentives with reward and autonomy with control.44  These theories 
align through a conception of progress that constructs a paradigmatic 
vision of the creative laborer as an individual author toiling for long 
hours on a labor of love with the hope that, once it is completed, she 
can sell it for a fair price, if she so chooses.45  By viewing this 
abstraction as an ideal form of creative production, copyright theory 
constructs a generalizable approach that does not require the drawing 
of difficult—and seemingly arbitrary—distinctions between similar 
creative outputs on the basis of the author’s time invested, motivation 
for creation, or attachment to the final work.46 
This romantic view of creative expression fits into a larger 
teleology of progress that prioritizes the continual professional 
 
which people only do to avoid starving, engaging in creative labor is not a task in need of 
external incentives.”). 
 41.  Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism 
in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1547-48 (1993). 
 42.  Hughes, supra note 40, at 337-41; Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 
34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 986-88 (1982) (drawing a distinction between personal and fungible 
property). 
 43.  Stan J. Liebowitz, Is Efficient Copyright a Reasonable Goal, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1692, 1693 (2010) (arguing that a perfectly efficient copyright regime would not be fair because it 
would deprive creators from a reward for their labor); see Sharing and Stealing, supra note 39. 
 44.  See Cohen, supra note 6. 
 45.  See Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship”, 
1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 468-71; Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and 
Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the ‘Author’, 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425, 426 
(1984). 
 46.  Cohen, supra note 6, at 1162. 
308 VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW [Vol. 15:2:297 
development of new, highly original, and highly valuable works.47  
Utilitarian theories attempt to find an objective method to ensure that 
society directs investment in cultural production to the best (most 
valuable) ends.48  For rights theories, it is important that authors are 
rewarded in proportion to the worth of the product.49  The utilitarian 
and rights-based approaches align here when they share a view of 
copyright’s purpose as a value-neutral method of promoting progress 
by providing a marketplace for expression.50  By seeking an efficient 
competitive market in expression, utilitarian approaches are able to 
assume that the total price a creator receives in the market reflects 
her required incentive and the aggregate demand for the product. 
For rights theories, the same meritocratic assumption works to 
identify an author’s just deserts: the total price a creator is able to 
extract for a work reflects its social worth.51  A key attraction of the 
conjunction of utilitarian and rights theories is the ability to further 
progress while avoiding difficult judgments on the value of expression 
by “retreat[ing] to a process-based vision of merit-based selection.”52  
By equating merit with market value, this procedural approach 
ensures both that the market rewards authors in proportion with their 
talent and contribution53 and that the market directs investment and 
creative labor to the most valuable ends.54  In essence, this approach 
assumes the price an author can command is both the amount 
required to incentivize her to create and the amount she deserves.55 
 
 47.  See Chon, supra note 29, at 114-22. 
 48.  See Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of Information 
Production, 22 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 81, 83 (2002); see generally Harold Demsetz, Information 
and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J. L. ECON. 1 (1969). 
 49.  See Cohen, supra note 6, at 1165. 
 50.  See id.  
 51.  See id. 
 52.  See id.; see also Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 
(1903). 
 53.  See Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of Rights 
Management, 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 512 (1998) (arguing that in some circumstances, copyright’s 
“merit-neutral stance is expressly intended to serve meritocratic as well as market ends”). 
 54.  See Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293, 
296 (1970) (discussing the role of excludability in ensuring that optimal levels of public goods are 
produced); Lunney, Jr., supra note 11, at 489 (“From an allocative-efficiency perspective, 
copyright provides the proper degree of protection when it ensures that individuals will produce 
works of authorship if, and only if, such production would represent the most highly valued use 
of their resources.”); Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social 
Values in Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 842, 856 (1992); see also Cohen, supra note 
6, at 1200; Frischmann, supra note 19, at 658 (critiquing the proposition that “[i]nternalization is 
the ‘silver bullet’ that aligns private and social welfare”); Lemley, supra note 23, at 1041 
(critiquing the tendency in economic theory to favor full appropriation of social value in order to 
maximize welfare). 
 55.  See Waldron, supra note 54, at 851-52.  
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This dominant vision of progress goes a long way to explaining 
the assumed necessity of exclusivity.  The progress imperative 
requires a method of determining value in order to encourage and 
reward the continual development of new, highly original, creative 
works.  Exclusivity allows a commodity market in expression, and the 
market provides an objective method of valuing creative works.  In 
this context, abundance models that use purely economic arguments 
to decouple incentives from exclusivity in copyright fail because they 
break the link between incentives and reward.  Economic theories 
aimed at providing alternative answers to the public goods problem 
seek to determine how authors can earn a reasonable return on 
creative production, but unlike the commodity-market model, these 
theories are unable to show that this return is also the amount that 
authors deserve.56 
Rather than engage directly with both the utilitarian and 
rights theories, mainstream copyright discourse suffers from a 
problematic quest for ideological purity, which attempts to prove one 
over the other.57  Because these theoretical justifications supposedly 
cover the field of normative approaches, their opposition constrains 
our thinking about the potential evolution of copyright law.58  The 
unfortunate result is a lowest-common-denominator endorsement of 
exclusivity that is able to satisfy both theories simultaneously, to the 
detriment of a richer understanding of the complex network of social 
interactions through which creative expression flows. 
II. THE IMPOVERISHED VIEW OF ACCESS IN THE COPYRIGHT BALANCE 
Both utilitarian and rights theories require some form of 
balance between the interests of authors in having exclusive rights 
and the interests of the public in having access to expressive works.  
This balance pits the authors’ interests (incentives or rewards) against 
the more inchoate interests of society (or users), and the balance 
generally tips in favor of the more concrete authorial interests.59  As a 
 
 56.  See Kenneth Einar Himma, The Justification of Intellectual Property: Contemporary 
Philosophical Disputes, 59 J. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 1143, 1152 (2008). 
 57.  See Cohen, supra note 6, at 1155.  
 58.  See id. at 1158; see also John Tehranian, Parchment, Pixels, & Personhood: User 
Rights and the IP (Identity Politics) of IP (Intellectual Property), 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 17 (2011) 
(“The existing polemic, which typically pits labor-desert and personhood interests against 
utilitarian interests, does not, and should not, fully define the metes and bounds of the policy 
discourse.”). 
 59.  See James Boyle, Essay, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the 
Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87, 95-97 (1997); see also MERGES, supra note 23, at 82-83 (“An 
understanding of IP that embraces creator autonomy directs us to resolve close cases, those 
where the costs and benefits of IP protections are in doubt, in favor of creators.”); PATTERSON & 
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result, both theoretical accounts commonly understand 
uncompensated access, or free riding, to be normatively harmful. 
A. The Impact of Limited Access on Users and Authors 
From the utilitarian perspective, the balance metaphor 
requires copyright policy to weigh the incentives provided to authors 
(or publishers) against the deadweight losses that arise from raising 
access prices above the minimum costs of distribution.  This problem 
is largely intractable within the incentives-access paradigm; as 
Kenneth Arrow points out, “precisely to the extent that . . . [property 
rights in information are] successful, there is an underutilization of 
the information.”60  If copyright incentives are necessary to produce 
creative expression, and greater incentives lead to more production,61 
then reducing deadweight loss by decreasing copyright protection in 
order to increase access necessarily means reducing production.62  In 
general terms, as long as copyright incentives are necessary, any 
deadweight losses they produce are unavoidable.63  If all users are 
 
BIRCH, JR., supra note 32, at 235-36; Cohen, supra note 6, at 1196-97; Julie E. Cohen, The Place 
of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 374 (2005). There are, of course, some 
notable exceptions. See, e.g., CCH Can. Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2004] S.C.R 339 (Can.) 
(treating fair-dealing exceptions as users’ rights, a fundamental component of copyright policy, 
not to be interpreted restrictively). 
 60.  Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, 
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 617 (Richard R. Nelson ed., 1962). 
 61.  See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 1569, 1579-81 (2008) (discussing the dominant linear view of incentives in copyright 
doctrine); Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What’s So Fair About Fair Use? The 1999 
Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture (Nov. 11, 1999), in 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 513, 524 
(1999); Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 343-44 (2002). 
 62.  See Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis, Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh in 
on Copyright: The Role of Theory, Empirics, & Network Effects, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 435,  
440-41 (2005) (“A system of private ownership providing the incentive for creation cannot give a 
reward to the creator without also having an apparent deadweight loss in the consumption 
market.”); see also Lunney, Jr., supra note 11, at 569. 
 63.  See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 62, at 442. (“Once one accepts copyright as the 
mechanism to provide incentives for creative works, and agrees that all books are given the same 
copyright term, then the ‘productive’ deadweight losses are best understood as irrelevant to 
welfare considerations, since there is no other manner in which they could become part of the 
surplus within the confines of the chosen copyright mechanism.”). Note that the Authors 
distinguish between “productive” deadweight loss caused by necessary incentives and 
unnecessary deadweight losses realized after an author recoups a sufficient price to justify 
investment, but reach no conclusion as to whether any additional extension of copyright would 
result in more benefit from extra incentives than harm from unproductive deadweight loss. See 
Real Copyright Reform, supra note 14, at 29 (critiquing the argument that “[d]iminishing 
copyright . . . will decrease authors’ incentives to create and distribute new works, leaving 
readers, listeners, and viewers with fewer new works to enjoy”). 
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rational actors who would prefer not to pay for access, limiting free 
riding is a necessary part of maintaining an efficient market.64 
For rights-based approaches, free riding is often wrongful 
because there is no general right of access to another’s creative 
expression.65  Generally speaking, rights-based arguments rely upon 
one of two propositions: (1) the labor-desert proposition, which argues 
that creators should be able to control what they create, or (2) the 
proposition that creators are personally invested in their creations and 
are accordingly entitled to property rights to ensure that their 
personality interests are respected.66  The common Lockean  
labor-desert claim is fundamentally based on avoiding the harm to the 
laborer that occurs when others appropriate the laborer’s expression.67  
Because expression is nonrivalrous, this claim usually rests on the 
assumption that copying interferes with the laborer’s plans to sell or 
control her expression.68  Personality arguments justify similarly 
strong authorial control.69  In these arguments, free riding is harmful 
because it can interfere with the author’s plan for the work.70 
Because neither utilitarian nor rights theories view barriers 
imposed on access as undesirable, the major limit on copyright comes 
only from the impact of exclusivity on future authors.  In utilitarian 
theory, this limit comes from the dynamic nature of incentives to 
create.71  Since creative expression inevitably draws on past works, 
 
 64.  See Cohen, supra note 59, at 351 (arguing that from a perspective of copyright that 
focuses on an economic view of access, “[t]he economic user’s motivations for unauthorized 
copying are easy to understand—he is trying to get away with paying less than the market price 
for a particular cultural good—but thwarting them is untroubling for the same reason”); see also 
Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 276 (2007) 
(arguing that intellectual property law should not seek to internalize the full social benefit of 
new works); Lemley, supra note 23, at 1032 (arguing that free riding is a fundamental part of the 
utilitarian copyright balance). 
 65.  See Himma, supra note 56, at 1159 (“The author’s interest wins over the interests of 
other persons in content that is merely desired.”). 
 66.  See Tehranian, supra note 58, at 9-11. 
 67.  See Gordon, supra note 41, at 1544-45.  
 68.  See id. at 1547; McGowan, supra note 23, at 39.  
 69.  See Hughes, supra note 40, at 337-39; see also Neil Netanel, Copyright Alienability 
Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERS 
L.J. 347, 374-77 (1992). But see Jeanne L. Schroeder, Unnatural Rights: Hegel and Intellectual 
Property, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 453, 500-01 (2005) (arguing that use of Hegel to justify the 
necessity of either exclusive property rights or moral rights regimes are based on a fundamental 
misreading of Hegelian theory, which holds that “[t]he content of any specific property regime 
can only be determined by positive law, and positive law is a creature of pragmatic reasoning, 
not speculative logic” (footnote omitted)). 
 70.  See MERGES, supra note 23, at 77-78; cf. Waldron, supra note 54, at 883-84 
(critiquing rights arguments that view copying as necessarily harmful). 
 71.  See the argument that: 
A single-minded focus on incentivizing creation could lead to maximalist intellectual 
property claims. The only limit on intellectual property would be found in (l) the claim 
312 VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW [Vol. 15:2:297 
any increase of incentives for authors will impose more costs on future 
authors as access becomes more expensive.72  Law-and-economics 
approaches to copyright theory address the difficult balancing process 
largely by defining around it.73  First, theorists point out that 
copyright rarely gives a monopoly in the classical sense, since most 
expressive works are fungible and substitutable on the market.74  
Second, the construction of the idea-expression dichotomy ensures 
that the pool of human knowledge is ever expanding; increasing 
copyright protection increases incentives and therefore the number of 
works produced, and users will thus have a greater pool of ideas to 
consume and build upon, even as access to any particular expression 
becomes increasingly costly.75 
For rights-based approaches, exclusivity must not interfere 
with the autonomy or liberty of other individuals.  In Lockean theory, 
an appropriation can be justified only on the proviso that it leaves 
“enough and as good” an opportunity for future laborers.76  Similarly, 
personality theories emphasize that future authors must have the 
ability to express themselves.77  Again, these limitations are often 
defined by an assumption that the idea-expression dichotomy provides 
sufficient access for future authors.78 
In both cases, a view of progress that prizes originality in 
expression informs the trust that the idea-expression dichotomy is 
 
that additional intellectual property rights are unnecessary to spur creation, and (2) 
situations where expanding intellectual property rights for some will interfere with 
others’ ability to create. 
Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Foreword, Is Nozick Kicking Rawls’s Ass? Intellectual 
Property and Social Justice, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 563, 574 (2006). 
 72.  See JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 
154-56 (2008); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD 105 (2001); LITMAN, supra note 32, at 15-16.  
 73.  See Boyle, supra note 59, at 96-97.  
 74.  See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic 
Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1734 (2000); William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 518 (“Valuable 
works are also those that confer monopoly power.”).  
 75.  See Goldstein, supra note 14, at 2-3; Hughes, supra note 40, at 325; Kitch, supra 
note 74, at 1730; R. Polk Wagner, Essay, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and 
the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1034 (2003). 
 76.  See Gordon, supra note 41, at 1562-70.  
 77.  See MERGES, supra note 23, at 91 (“Just as with Locke, Kant requires that an 
appropriator take others into account from the outset, from the moment of first appropriation. 
And Kant does so for a very similar reason: because he considers the needs and potential claims 
of others just as important as those of the owner.”); see also Hughes, supra note 40, at 336 
(arguing that limits of appropriation based on autonomy of third parties in personality theory 
are very similar to the Lockean proviso that appropriation leave as much and as good for others). 
 78.  See Abraham Drassinower, A Rights-Based View of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy 
in Copyright Law, 16 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 3, 18-19 (2003); see also Leslie A Kurtz, 
Speaking to the Ghost: Idea and Expression in Copyright, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1221, 1254 (1992). 
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effective.  The teleology of progress presupposes the continual 
romantic production of works of original genius that advance their 
fields, providing enjoyment in themselves and bringing new ideas into 
existence.  Compared to the genius of original authorship, the “slavish 
copying” of expression appears relatively unimportant.79 
B. Access in an Abundant Age 
The result of this teleology of progress and the conjunction of 
economic and rights theories is a view of access that the market 
adequately fulfills.  “Access,” under the dominant ideal of progress, 
means access to a smoothly functioning commodity market with low 
transaction costs where almost every flow of information is metered 
and priced at a sufficiently low rate to satisfy broad demand.80  A 
competitive, efficient marketplace means that both consumers and 
future authors can obtain a license for any use at a reasonable fee.81  
Exceptions to the rule can then predominantly be confined to 
identifiable instances of market failure.82  Balancing incentives and 
access is accordingly reducible to ensuring that there are sufficient 
incentives to maintain diversity of expression and sufficient 
competition to ensure relatively low prices. 
While this vision of access likely provides the best possible 
outcome for publishers, there is no guarantee that it represents the 
best copyright deal imaginable for the public.83  This vision of 
copyright idealizes the market as a “celestial jukebox,” in which the 
entire store of recorded human creativity will be digitized and 
everyone will, for a reasonable fee, be able to access the most obscure, 
esoteric works in any format and on any device.84  But the model of 
 
 79.  See Jessica Silbey, The Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual Property, 15 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 319, 348 (2007). 
 80.  See, e.g., BART CAMMAERTS & BINGCHUN MENG, CREATIVE DESTRUCTION AND 
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 9 (2011) (“Providing user-friendly, hassle-free solutions to enable users 
to download music legally at a reasonable price, is a much more effective strategy to enforce 
copyright than a heavy-handed legislative and regulatory regime.”); Karaganis, supra note 17 
(arguing that media piracy should essentially be regarded as a failure in appropriate pricing). 
 81.  See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 
2005) (“Get a license or do not sample. We do not see this as stifling creativity in any significant 
way.”). 
 82.  See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1615 (1982). 
 83.  See LITMAN, supra note 32, at 35-75 (explaining that copyright bargains reached by 
industry stakeholders are not generally drafted with the public’s interests in mind); see also 
Litman, supra note 39, at 39-40 (arguing that the digital marketplace model “is not particularly 
enticing”). 
 84.  See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE 
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX (2003). 
314 VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW [Vol. 15:2:297 
copyright as a commodity market85 is a model of access fundamentally 
predicated on artificial scarcity—a model that deliberately limits 
access in order to make it more profitable.86  It is a model that 
encourages publishers to attempt to control and monetize each distinct 
act of access and cultural dissemination.87  It is a model, perversely, in 
which the most socially valuable expression is the most contained and 
the most expensive.  It is also a model in which “access” 
predominantly means “consumption”; the room it leaves for creative 
play88 remains tightly controlled by intermediary publishers. 
The Internet infrastructure that provides zero-marginal-cost 
distribution should cast doubt on this conception of access.  The 
potential abundance of expression has tremendous benefits for access 
to knowledge and culture.  With some effort, all connected individuals 
could have immediate access to almost perfect reproductions of the 
entire wealth of recorded cultural expression on their personal 
computers, portable devices, and in schools and public libraries.89  In 
that world, the common wealth of human creativity could circulate 
freely in a virtuous cycle of reexpression, in which citizens can freely 
learn, play with, and rearticulate cultural expression.  But the 
continued prevalence of the incentives-access paradigm pushes these 
visions to the margins.90  As long as scarcity is viewed as 
fundamentally necessary in order to stimulate future production and 
progress, increasing access by decreasing exclusivity will continue to 
be counterproductive.91 
III. A VISION OF PROGRESS THAT FOREGROUNDS ACCESS 
If progress is copyright’s core goal, we should critically examine 
the assumption that it is best served by an exclusive market of 
expression.  The dominant view of progress focuses on a teleological 
ideal of romantic production.  This Article explores how copyright 
 
 85.  See Cohen, supra note 15, at 38. 
 86.  See Georgia Harper, OA, IRs and IP: Open Access, Digital Copyright and 
Marketplace Competition, 4 AM. LIBRARY ASSOC. 2009 MIDWINTER MEETING, http://wikis.ala.org/ 
midwinter2009/images/5/5e/Harper_G_MW09handout.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2012).  
 87.  See Cohen, supra note 15, at 39 (“Pervasively distributed copyright enforcement 
seeks to produce standardized, predictable flows of information.”). 
 88.  See Cohen, supra note 6. 
 89.  There remains, of course, a significant digital divide problem in the disparity of 
access to telecommunications services enjoyed by marginalized groups in developed communities 
and the bulk of citizens in developing countries. See L.M., Hailing the Google Bus, ECONOMIST 
(Oct. 2, 2011, 10:22 AM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/10/internet-developing-
countries. 
 90.  See Lunney, Jr., supra note 11. 
 91.  See Harper, supra note 86, at 1.  
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might look if it focused on access, the impoverished half of the 
incentives-access binary.  Much of the tension in modern copyright 
discourse stems from the clash between two normative visions: one 
where the celestial jukebox can provide adequate (even ideal) access to 
cultural expression, and one where users are substantially freer to 
access, learn from, and play with abundant expression.92  The shared 
understanding in the mainstream copyright dialectic is that the 
public’s desire to access copyright expression without paying must be 
restrained for the common good.93  Increasingly, however, stronger 
normative justifications for abundance models—and even  
piracy94—are emerging.95  By highlighting the positive effects of the 
nonrivalrous nature of information, this discourse has inverted the 
traditional conception of intellectual property as a solution to the 
tragedy of the commons.  These “commons” theories challenge the 
implicit assumption that the commodity market provides adequate 
access to cultural expression, focusing on the benefits of abundant flow 
of expression that a tightly controlled, metered, and commoditized 
model of access cannot deliver.96  Many authors have considered the 
virtues of nonrivalrous sharing; this Article draws on this literature to 
emphasize the benefits of abundance, sharing, serendipitous 
discovery, and the continuous flow of creative works to knowledge, 
entertainment, self-expression, and play. 
A. Access 
First, access in itself should be encouraged.  Access to cultural 
expression is the means by which people learn and grow.97  The spread 
of knowledge through society is a fundamental component of 
progress.98  In particular, society should encourage access to learning 
 
 92.  See generally Madison et al., supra note 12, at 659 (developing a model of commons 
management of intellectual property). 
 93.  See id. at 666. 
 94.  See, e.g., Letter from Shuddhabrata Sengupta, A Letter to the Commons (Jan. 19, 
2007), available at http://archive.icommons.org/articles/a-letter-to-the-commons. 
 95.  See Cohen, supra note 6, at 1157-58.  
 96.  See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 2, at 5.  
 97.  See L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW 
OF USERS’ RIGHTS 52 (1991); PATTERSON & BIRCH, JR., supra note 32, at 284 (“The primary goal 
of copyright is the promotion of learning.”); Rebecca Tushnet, Essay, Copy This Essay: How Fair 
Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 565-66 (2004) 
(“Copying promotes democracy by literally putting information in citizens’ hands.”). 
 98.  Eben Moglen, for example, makes the point that human society must have wasted 
the potential of thousands of Einsteins by not providing them with sufficient access to knowledge 
and potential to learn. He describes the political goal of the information society as realizing:  
the desire to make it possible for everybody to be exposed to that which makes brains 
larger, more powerful, more humane, more thoughtful, which decreases recourse to 
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materials as widely as possible.99  The nonrivalrous nature of 
information, in this sense, can be extremely beneficial to substantive 
equality by increasing access to cultural goods without imposing costs 
on creators (setting aside, for the moment, the public goods production 
problem).100  On distributional grounds, the great social cost of 
excluding users who cannot afford to pay the monopoly price of 
copyright expression, which is costless to distribute, is deeply 
troubling.101 
B. Abundance 
Second, abundance in expression is fundamentally desirable.  
When expression is scarce, users must exercise judgment before 
determining whether it is worth consuming or not.102  Consumers 
must balance the benefit they expect to receive against the costs they 
expect to bear.103  Even when the costs are insignificant, this  
 
violence and the sense of desperation, the desire to do what we all know it is best to do 
for ourselves and therefore what we ought to know it is best to do for other people as 
well. 
Eben Moglen, Software Freedom Conservancy, Free and Open Software: Paradigm for a New 
Intellectual Commons, Law of the Commons Conference (Mar. 13, 2009), available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tbcy_ZxXLl8. Furthering that point, Professor Litman states: 
Already, a network of people sharing what they know has made many of the most 
popular reference sources obsolete. Thus, one might reasonably expect that a law 
designed to promote the Progress of Science would encourage the robust growth and 
prodigious use of this network to exchange the full spectrum of interesting material. 
Litman, supra note 39, at 14. 
 99.  See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property from Below: Copyright and Capability for 
Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803, 846 (2006). 
 100.  See id. at 841; Robert Cunningham, The Tragedy of (Ignoring) the Information 
Semicommons: A Cultural Environmental Perspective, 4 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 19-20 (2010). 
 101.  James Boyle, Property Rights: Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price 
Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2031 (2000) (“[A]ny 
analyst who is even a little uneasy about the ‘ability and willingness to pay’ metric of valuation 
would find it particularly hard to say that the poor should not get access to a social resource with 
zero marginal cost simply because they cannot afford to pay for it.”); Chon, supra note 99, at 833 
(arguing that while “[i]n the public goods jargon, static inefficiencies (or higher costs of goods) 
are generated as an inevitable residual of IP protection such as copyright,” the costs of 
prohibiting access to educational materials, from a substantive equality perspective, are very 
great). Professor Gordon notes:  
Culture is interdependence, and requiring each act of deliberate dependency to render 
an accounting would destroy the synergy on which cultural life rests. Even if the 
accounting were done painlessly—by a magic computer that somehow could costlessly 
determine who contributed what and could prepare a continuously up-to-date,  
self-executing list of debits and credits—part of our self-concept as a people depends 
upon our having a common heritage. Parceling out that heritage to only those willing 
and able to pay destroys part of its value. 
Gordon, supra note 5, at 168. 
 102.  See ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 59. 
 103.  See id. 
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cost-benefit analysis plays an important role in slowing down access.  
The result is a dampening of serendipitous exposure.104  Abundant 
access to cultural goods means that consumers are more likely to be 
exposed to expression that brings unexpected benefits—benefits they 
did not foresee and could not have bargained for.  This can also 
provide a real benefit to authors, who are potentially able to gain 
increased exposure and reach a larger audience than if every reader 
had to estimate in advance whether the perceived benefit would be 
worth the asking price.105  Abundance in culture promotes flow, which 
furthers progress by fostering diversity and destabilization in “settled 
modes of knowing.”106 
C. Sharing 
Third, sharing has substantial social value.  Economically, 
peer-to-peer file sharing can be much more efficient than centralized 
distribution models, particularly because volunteer users are often 
prepared to bear the costs of digitizing, organizing, and distributing 
expressive material.107  It follows that copyright law should not aim to 
impose access costs in order to support entrenched distribution models 
unless no other viable, more efficient mechanisms exist.108  More 
importantly, however, sharing is important in itself.  Sharing can be 
personally expressive, as when someone puts great care into creating 
a mix-tape for a friend,109 collates an obscure collection of her favorite 
works for the public to enjoy, or quotes extensively from powerful 
material to persuade an audience, to reaffirm a position, or to identify 
with a group.110  Communal enjoyment of shared expression is also 
very important; it provides a shared discourse for communication,111 a 
 
 104.  See id. at 61. 
 105.  Cory Doctorow, Think Like a Dandelion, LOCUS MAG., (May 6, 2008, 8:10 PM), 
http://www.locusmag.com/Features/2008/05/cory-doctorow-think-like-dandelion.html (arguing 
that traditional conceptions of waste are much less important where distribution costs are 
negligible and that it is more important to increase the potential audience by facilitating copying 
than to ensure payment is received for each and every copy). 
 106.  See Cohen, supra note 6, at 1168; see also Ralph D. Clifford, Random Numbers, 
Chaos Theory, and Cogitation: A Search for the Minimal Creativity Standard in Copyright Law, 
82 DENV. U. L. REV. 259, 274 (2004) (“There is increasing scientific evidence that chance is the 
primary source for novel thoughts.”). 
 107.  See Litman, supra note 39, at 8-9. 
 108.  See id. at 30-31 (“If sharing is a more effective method of dissemination than selling 
copies, then prohibiting sharing to protect the market for copy sales is exactly backward.”). 
 109.  Tushnet, supra note 97, at 545, 566-67. 
 110.  Id. at 562, 566-67 (explaining the benefits of non-transformative copying for  
self-expression, persuasion, and affirmation). 
 111.  Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397, 411-12 
(2003); Tushnet, supra note 97, at 545-46. 
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way for fans to connect with others who enjoy particular works, and a 
way for groups to spread information about newly discovered works.112  
Much more than simple unpaid distribution and marketing, sharing is 
a social act, a conversation between users about the material that 
animates and connects them.113  Through these conversations, sharing 
is itself a vital part of progress that the more sterile and 
commercialized distribution systems that centralized marketing 
models provide cannot fully replace.114 
D. Creative Play 
Fourth, rich access to expression is important because it is a 
predicate for creative play, which is valuable for its own sake as well 
as for its contribution to progress.  Borrowing, learning, and imitating 
are fundamental components of the creative process.115  “Progress” 
occurs when users grow and when they share their own creative play 
with society.116  The familiar emphasis on romantic creativity 
preferences “original” expression and undervalues the harm caused by 
exclusive restrictions on use of expression.117  As countless theorists 
have noted, creativity does not occur in a vacuum.118  The romantic 
myth of the author as a solitary genius creating wholly original work 
largely emerged from, and was popularized for, political purposes.119  
 
 112.  See Sharing and Stealing, supra note 39, at 7 (explaining the benefits of sharing for 
the dissemination of information); see also Jenine Peta Beekhuyzen, A Critical Ethnography of 
an Online File Sharing Community: An Actor-Network Theory Perspective of Controversies in 
the Digital Music World 31 (Dec. 2009), (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Griffith University) (on 
file with Griffith University), available at http://www4.gu.edu.au:8080/adt-
root/uploads/approved/adt-QGU20100909.072742/public/01Whole.pdf (describing the active 
participation of members of an underground filesharing community). 
 113.  See Litman, supra note 39, at 7. 
 114.  See id. at 23-24. 
 115.  See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy: Copyright, Creation, and Context, 
41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 477, 482 (2007). 
 116.  MIHÁLY CSÍKSZENTMIHÁLYI, CREATIVITY: FLOW AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DISCOVERY 
AND INVENTION 6-7 (1997); Cohen, supra note 6, at 1191 (“Within the realm of creative practice, 
the play of culture is the to-and-fro in flows of artistic and cultural goods and in cultural 
practices of representation. Play in this sense is an essential enabling condition of cultural 
progress.”).  
 117.  Silbey, supra note 79, at 350 (“Much copyright doctrine remains preoccupied with 
valuing certain works of authorship more strongly than others”). 
 118.  See, e.g., Amy L. Landers, Ordinary Creativity in Patent Law: The Artist Within the 
Scientist, 75 MO. L. REV. 1, 59-60 (2010). 
 119.  JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 52 (1996); ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 219-20 (1998); KAPLAN, 
supra note 24, at 23-25; Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and 
Collective Creativity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 296-97 (1992); Jaszi, supra note 45, at 
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In practice, creativity is much more collaborative, iterative, and 
improvisational.120 
This conception of creativity is not limited to modern 
appropriation of art, remix, and sampling; even the highest examples 
of classical (romantic) authorship are fundamentally based on 
borrowing.121  Creative expression has always been a social practice, 
firmly embedded within the author’s cultural context.122  It is always, 
to some extent, the re-expression of existing cultural works.123  
Learning and imitating past expression is a vital part of the creative 
process that requires not that works be wholly original, but that they 
be sufficiently “appropriate” to be understandable within a particular 
cultural context.124  Increased access and lower barriers to producing 
and distributing expression are likely to promote a more 
decentralized, diverse culture.125  Recognizing that the  
romantic-author myth undervalues accessing, borrowing, and  
re-expressing existing expression should cast serious doubt on the 
appropriateness of the idea-expression dichotomy in providing 
sufficient leeway for future creators, therefore mitigating the harmful 
effects of exclusivity in copyright.126  Even without the instrumental 
 
458-59; Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 279, 287-89 (1992). 
 120.  See BOYLE, supra note 72, at 153-54; LESSIG, supra note 72, at 105; Arewa, supra 
note 115, at 494 (arguing that views of creativity in copyright doctrine are often at odds with “the 
reality of borrowing and copying in the creation of new works”); Jaszi, supra note 119, at 304; 
Tushnet, supra note 97, at 552 (“As Picasso (or someone else) said, ‘Good artists borrow; great 
artists steal.’” (footnote omitted)). 
 121.  See JACK STILLINGER, MULTIPLE AUTHORSHIP AND THE MYTH OF SOLITARY GENIUS 
98 (1991); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright 
and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 601-06 (2006) (describing pervasive borrowing by 
masters in the classical music canon); John Carlin, Culture Ventures: Artistic Appropriation and 
Intellectual Property Law, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 103, 106 (1988) (“In the early twentieth 
century, the incorporation of existing source material directly into works of art became 
commonplace. . . . In literature the same basic technique underlies some of the most important 
works of Modernism . . . .”); Michael J. Madison, Beyond Creativity: Copyright as Knowledge 
Law, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 817, 837-38 (2010) (describing borrowing as intrinsic to the 
learning, practicing, and creative process of Vincent van Gogh). 
 122.  Cohen, supra note 6, at 1189. 
 123.  See id. at 1176-77; Jaszi, supra note 45, at 459-63; Jessica Litman, The Public 
Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 966-67 (1990). 
 124.  CSÍKSZENTMIHÁLYI, supra note 116, at 28-30 (defining creativity as being dependent 
on acceptance within a domain); Fromer, supra note 25, at 1499 (“[A]rtists, scientists, and 
engineers typically—although not always—need to spend substantial amounts of time learning 
that which came before them to be able to create in their particular domain.”). 
 125.  See Litman, supra note 39, at 26. 
 126.  See Arewa, supra note 115, at 491 (arguing that the reasoning behind the 
idea-expression dichotomy conflicts “with views of creation evident in fields such as musicology 
and literary criticism”); Cohen, supra note 6, at 1192-93; Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright 
unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 81-82 (2004) (arguing that 
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argument, however, when creativity is a private, unrewarded, and 
unacknowledged act, it is a fundamental component of the good life.127  
Creativity is active enjoyment, where the user grows through personal 
exploration and manipulation of cultural expression.128  This growth is 
beneficial and desirable for its own sake. 
E. Pervasive Creativity 
Finally, while access is a predicate for creativity, the interests 
of authors should not be separated from those of users.  The romantic 
distinction  between creative authors and passive consumers is simply 
false.129  Creativity, as Professor Eben Moglen says, “flows in the 
network” of society.130  Creativity is not a scarce resource whose 
production society needs to incentivize—rather, creativity is 
abundant.131  More importantly, and perhaps most overlooked by the 
romantic vision, creativity is ordinary; it is not easily separable from 
consumption, but it instead forms part of a “continuous history of 
everyday cultural practice.”132  Recognizing that creativity is 
 
suppressing the reuse of copyright expression by users with a personal connection does not 
satisfy the Lockean proviso that property is only justified where it leaves “enough” for others). 
 127.  See William W. Fisher III, The Implications for Law of User Innovation, 94 MINN. L. 
REV. 1417, 1468-72 (2010); Silbey, supra note 24, at 2118 (“[T]he value of the work is in the 
everyday, not in the rare moment of inspiration. Even work that is less successful is a source of 
pride and honor because it is the doing, not the value of the end-product, that is worthwhile.”). 
Professor Tushnet also argues that:  
Creativity, including remix creativity, is part of a good life. It should be valued for 
itself, not tolerated. . . . [R]espect for creativity, and for the possibility that every 
person has new meaning to contribute, should be at the core of our copyright policy. 
Instead of monetary rewards or even artistic control of how works are transmitted to 
others as our highest value, we should aim for policies that maximize 
participation . . . . 
Tushnet, supra note 25, at 538-39 (footnote omitted). 
 128.  CSÍKSZENTMIHÁLYI, supra note 116, at 2, 5. 
 129.  See Cohen, supra note 6, at 1192-93; Silbey, supra note 79, at 348; Tushnet, supra 
note 97, at 566-68. 
 130.  Moglen, supra note 24 (“It’s an emergent property of connected human minds that 
they create things for one another’s pleasure and to conquer their uneasy sense of being too 
alone.”). 
 131.  Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
951, 989-90 (2004) (explaining the importance of “selection” to the copyright industries in 
identifying the most valuable works from an abundant pool of creativity); Madison, supra note 
121, at 821; Tushnet, supra note 25, at 522-27 (explaining that “[m]any standard experiences of 
creativity simply do not fit into the incentive model” and describing compulsions to create: 
“People create as a function of their humanity[,]” or “creativity routinely feels good.” (emphasis 
added)); see YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 92-99 (2006) (discussing motivations to produce). 
 132.  See Jean E. Burgess, User-Created Content and Everyday Cultural Practice: Lessons 
From YouTube, in TELEVISION AS DIGITAL MEDIA 311, 316 (James Bennett & Niki Strange eds., 
2011); see also Jean E. Burgess, Hearing Ordinary Voices: Cultural Studies, Vernacular 
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pervasive, distributed, and abundant highlights a deep bias in 
copyright theory: the preference for professional authorship over the 
“substandard” content that amateurs and copiers create.133  Copyright 
must provide a means to allocate capital for large-scale professional 
productions.134  Importantly, however, there is no strict dichotomy 
between amateur and professional creators; creative practice is much 
more fluid.135  Copyright policy should also avoid assuming that the 
publisher-dominated market provides an objective evaluation of the 
value of cultural production.136  Indeed, if creativity is not a scarce 
resource, society may be able to reject the meritocratic need to engage 
in a priori valuation and instead explore other selection mechanisms 
that evolve out of a richer abundance of creative output.137  It follows 
that if one of copyright’s aims should be to encourage creativity itself, 
it should do so primarily by ensuring that members of society have 
sufficient access to cultural works and the ability to use, learn from, 
and reexpress them.138 
 
Creativity and Digital Storytelling, 20 CONTINUUM: J. MEDIA & CULTURAL STUD. 201 (2006) 
(explaining “vernacular creativity”). 
 133.  See ANDREW KEEN, THE CULT OF THE AMATEUR 17, 92 (2007). 
 134.  See Copyright as Property, supra note 24, at 148. 
 135.  See Jean Burgess & Joshua Green, The Entrepreneurial Vlogger: Participatory 
Culture Beyond the Professional-Amateur Divide, in THE YOUTUBE READER 89, 90 (Pelle 
Snickars & Patrick Vonderau eds., 2009) (arguing, in the context of user-generated content on 
YouTube, that it is “clear that amateur and professional media content, identities and 
motivations are not so easily separated”); see also Fisher III, supra note 127, at 1434-35. 
 136.  See C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311,  
324-27, 337-40 (1997) (explaining that the incentives provided by copyright will often favor some 
forms of content over others and encourage wasteful production and competition between 
substitutable products); Chon, supra note 29, at 117-22 (critiquing modernist teleological views 
of progress as growth); Lochner in Cyberspace, supra note 53, at 557-58; Frischmann, supra note 
19,at 670 (arguing that the market “demand signaling function of the price mechanism does not 
necessarily work well when purchasers/licensees use a resource as an input to produce public 
goods (e.g., information) and merit/nonmarket goods (e.g., education)”); Shelley Wright, A 
Feminist Exploration of the Legal Protection of Art, 7 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 59, 70 (1994) 
(critiquing the marginalization of women in the public art marketplace); cf. DAVID W. GALENSON, 
CONCEPTUAL REVOLUTIONS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY ART 341-42 (2009) (arguing that market 
price can be a useful indicator of artistic merit, but that a centralized art market with strong 
publisher control of expression can seriously inhibit creative experimentation and progress). 
 137.  NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 87 (2008); Hunter & Lastowka, 
supra note 131, at 998 (“Now that distributed selection is possible, ex post selection among works 
by decentralized agents seems to be a more socially beneficial alternative.”). 
 138.  See Cohen, supra note 6, at 1197 (“Creativity requires breathing room, and thrives 
on play in the system of culture.”); Moglen, supra note 24 (“The resistance of the network [of 
cultural production] is directly proportional to the field strength of the ‘intellectual property’ 
system.”). This powerfully suggests that copyright entitlements should be narrow and clearly 
incomplete, and that the scope for individual experimentation should be generous. Additionally: 
[R]espect for creativity, and for the possibility that every person has new meaning to 
contribute, should be at the core of our copyright policy. Instead of monetary rewards 
or even artistic control of how works are transmitted to others as our highest value, 
we should aim for policies that maximize participation. 
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The opposition of the two main theoretical justifications in 
copyright theory has led to a focus on incentives and exclusivity that 
has systematically understated the importance of access in the 
formulation of copyright policy.139  This result is wholly backwards: 
while the function of copyright is to provide incentives, its purpose is 
to promote progress, which fundamentally requires that users have 
access to expression.140  Cultural flow, the continuous consumption 
and play of expression, is itself exactly what progress is.141  Progress 
depends on cultural flow in order to ensure “that settled modes of 
knowing not become entrenched and calcified. . . .  Stripped of its 
association with modernist teleologies, progress consists, simply, in 
that which causes knowledge systems to come under challenge and 
sometimes to shift.”142  The reason society encourages cultural 
production is so that people can consume, enjoy, learn, and reexpress 
cultural works. 
IV. REVISITING THE ASSUMED NECESSITY OF EXCLUSIVITY 
This reconstituted vision of progress highlights just how 
problematic the incentives-access paradigm is.  Fundamentally, the 
incentives-access paradigm assumes that creative culture is zero sum: 
any benefit granted to users necessarily comes at the expense of 
authors and producers and, therefore, also at the expense of new 
creative expression.143  In a world where creativity is abundant and 
ordinary, however, this assumption is highly suspect.144  A view of 
progress that rests firmly on a virtuous cycle of cultural  
flow—continual access and reexpression—rejects this zero-sum view 
in favor of a view of culture that is substantially more 
interdependent.145  If incentives are unnecessary for creativity and 
 
Tushnet, supra note 25, at 539; see also Arewa, supra note 115, at 518-19 (discussing the conflict 
between copyright’s exclusivity and the “freedom to copy” in artistic practice). 
 139.  See Cohen, supra note 6, at 1996 (arguing that copyright’s “balance” metaphor tends 
to prefer concrete entitlements of authors and publishers over the more abstract interests of the 
public). 
 140.  PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 97. 
 141.  Professor Litman explains: 
The reason we want to encourage authors to create and distributors to disseminate 
works of authorship is so that people will read the books, listen to the music, look at 
the art, watch the movies, play the games, build and inhabit the architecture. That’s 
how copyright law promotes the progress of science. 
Jessica Litman, The Copyright Revision Act of 2026, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 249, 259 
(2009). 
 142.  Cohen, supra note 6, at 1168. 
 143.  See Lunney, Jr., supra note 11 (describing the “incentives-access paradigm”). 
 144.  See id. at 485. 
 145.  See id. at 569-70. 
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exclusivity is directly harmful, this reconstructed view of progress 
requires reconsideration of the continued dominance of the  
incentives-access paradigm.  A new paradigm must acknowledge that 
copyright has important functions not based in efficiency.  
Instrumentally, copyright must provide a mechanism for allocating 
capital and funding the production, marketing, and distribution of 
expressive works.146  Importantly, however, it must do so in a way that 
is fair.  If reconsidering exclusivity means severing the link between 
incentives and just rewards, the new paradigm must provide a new 
way to address both the desert function and the  
public-goods-production problem.  Ultimately, any viable critique of 
the incentives-access paradigm must articulate a new vision of both 
what is economically efficient and what is fair. 
A. Fairness in an Exclusive Marketplace 
One of the key tensions in current copyright law is that the 
exclusive copyright market is often unable to show that it is fair to 
either authors or users.  It provides an effective framework to 
facilitate the coordination of cultural production147 and a  
process-based method of ensuring that authors are remunerated in 
proportion to the value of their work.  At least in theory, exclusivity 
allows authors to obtain a fair market price for their creative 
productions.  In practice, however, copyright is structurally designed 
to encourage assignments from authors to producers and publishers.148  
By concentrating power and money in the hands of intermediaries, 
copyright allows producers to offset the flops against the hits in a 
highly unpredictable marketplace.149  Copyright provides some 
certainty to publishers, but the publisher-controlled marketplace 
ensures fairness to authors only on average: it provides extremely 
high rewards to an extremely small proportion of creators who are 
 
 146.  See Cohen, supra note 24 (“In the contemporary information society, the purpose of 
copyright is to enable the provision of capital and organization so that creative work may be 
exploited.”); Fromer, supra note 25, at 1483 (“It is therefore essential that organizations and 
individuals provide creators with support for professional success by paying for, promoting, 
marketing, and distributing their works.”). 
 147.  Cohen, supra note 24, at 153-54; Silbey, supra note 24, at 2123. 
 148.  Litman, supra note 16, at 11-12, 35. 
 149.  See Landes & Posner, supra note 74, at 495 (“Which will be hits and which will be 
flops is not known in advance. . . . Copyright protection enables the record company to earn 
enough money on the hits to cover both their costs and the production and marketing costs of the 
many failures.”). 
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able to win a lottery for attention.150  A larger group is able to find 
employment somewhere in the creative industries, but the majority of 
independent professional creators work multiple jobs to fund their 
personal creative work.151  The current system problematically 
concentrates rewards among a very small proportion of authors in a 
way that is much more closely linked to luck than to individual 
originality, skill, and talent.152 
There have been a number of attempts to address the  
public-goods problem in copyright theory without relying on an 
exclusive market.153  Broadly speaking, three main approaches for 
evaluating the reward that creators deserve have emerged, 
corresponding to a conceptual split between whether creators should 
be remunerated in proportion to their work’s consumption, their time 
invested in creating the work, or the value a user derives from the 
work.154 
 
 150.  See TOWSE, supra note 26 (arguing that copyright supports an asymmetry in market 
power between professional artists and publisher intermediaries and generally fails to 
adequately reward all but superstar artists). 
 151.  Litman, supra note 16, at 10; see also STUART CUNNINGHAM ET AL., WHAT’S YOUR 
OTHER JOB? A CENSUS ANALYSIS OF ARTS EMPLOYMENT IN AUSTRALIA 5 (2010) (“[In Australia,] 
arts employment is characterised by high levels of part-time work and the existence of many sole 
practitioners and business operators (unlike the total workforce in which full-time work by wage-
earning employees is the norm).”); MARTIN KRETSCHMER ET AL., COPYRIGHT CONTRACTS AND 
EARNINGS OF VISUAL CREATORS: A SURVEY OF 5,800 BRITISH DESIGNERS, FINE ARTISTS, 
ILLUSTRATORS AND PHOTOGRAPHERS 3 (2011), available at http://www.cippm.org.uk/ 
publications/DACS-Report-Final.pdf (finding that visual artists in the UK “have precarious 
careers, with typical earnings well below the UK national median wage” and that “[t]he 
distribution of income is highly unequal”); MARTIN KRETSCHMER & PHILIP HARDWICK, AUTHORS’ 
EARNINGS FROM COPYRIGHT AND NON-COPYRIGHT SOURCES: A SURVEY OF 25,000 BRITISH AND 
GERMAN WRITERS 23 (2007), available at http://www.cippm.org.uk/publications/alcs/ 
ACLS%20Full%20report.pdf (finding that professional writing is risky in the UK and Germany, 
with median wages of approximately 64 percent and 42 percent of the national median 
respectively and the top 10 percent of writers earning approximately 60 percent and 41 percent 
of the total income, respectively); Bureau of Labor Stat., Musicians, Singers, and Related 
Workers, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 2 (2010), http://www.principiacollege.edu/ 
sites/default/files/ACA/musicians,%20singers,%20and%20related%20workers.pdf (“Because 
many musicians find only part-time or intermittent work and experience unemployment between 
engagements, they often supplement their income with other types of jobs. The stress of 
constantly looking for work leads many musicians to accept permanent full-time jobs in other 
occupations while working part time as musicians.”). 
 152.  Arewa, supra note 26 (arguing that unpredictable lottery awards are difficult to 
justify compared to other contemporary creators, and particularly so “in the case of collaborative 
traditions such as the blues in which multiple participants over extended periods of time may 
have contributed to the corpus that was in the end awarded to lucky lottery winners”); Waldron, 
supra note 54, at 855 (“[F]orces of supply and demand will certainly benefit some producers (and 
perhaps penalize others). But they should not therefore be construed as a matter of desert.”). 
 153.  Netanel, supra note 2, at 27.  
 154.  Eckersley, supra note 2, at 99; Waldron, supra note 54, at 853-55.  
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B. Alternative Models 
The first set of models, levy-based alternate-compensation 
models, attempt to directly measure the use of creative works as an 
approximation of value.155  These models propose creating a simulated 
market to distribute a pool of money according to consumer 
preferences, calculated by various algorithms and reporting 
schemes.156  These models explicitly address the valuation function of 
the exclusive market by replacing it with a simulated market, and 
attempt to bootstrap their legitimacy from the status quo by 
replicating the returns authors currently receive, at least initially, 
while doing away with scarcity.157 
A second set of models relies on the nonrivalrous nature of 
expression and reject the assertion that society should reward creators 
in direct proportion to the consumption of their work.  These models 
emphasize the relational nature of creative production, arguing that 
without artificial scarcity, authors would be rewarded on the basis of 
what is scarce—skill and talent in creative services, complementary 
goods, or the audience attention authors are able to capture.158  In 
these models, professional authors can support themselves by creating 
commissioned works through advertising and product placement, 
cross-subsidization from valuable services like performances or 
speaking engagements, and sales of merchandise and other  
value-added goods.159  Some of these models also rely on alternative 
methods of raising capital for cultural production, where creators can 
solicit funds through voluntary tips, “pay-what-you-like” schemes, and 
crowd-sourced financing.160 
A third model seeks to fulfill copyright’s desert function by 
measuring an author’s entitlement by reference to the value of her 
expression.161  This model, loosely based on the principles of unjust 
enrichment, would impose an obligation on certain types of users, 
particularly commercial users, to account for a portion of the benefit 
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they derive through use of creative expression.162  This model takes 
seriously the rights-based arguments for copyright and attempts to 
create a structure that allows unremunerated personal use but 
requires compensation for commercial uses.163  By tying desert to 
derived value, this model creates a measure of worth and reward that 
is not directly reliant on an actual or simulated market.164 
V. FAIR REWARDS IN COPYRIGHT THEORY 
A. Fair Rewards 
The first avenue for research that this Article proposes is a 
deeper investigation of fairness in copyright theory.  Each of the 
abundance models discussed in this Article reflects a deep theoretical 
divide over how society should reward creative labor.  The dominant 
view of progress in copyright rests on the ideal of the independent, 
romantic genius who toils to produce a creative work embodied (fixed) 
in a product: the book, the record, the painting, or the compact disc, to 
name a few.165  In order to ensure that investors have the right 
incentives to invest in the best work and that authors are rewarded in 
proportion to the worth of their works, this dominant vision of 
progress requires an accounting system based on access and use of 
distinct pieces of expression.166  It follows, in this system, that only a 
property or liability rule based on consumption will guarantee fair 
rewards.167  This bias explains the development of the levy-based 
alternate-compensation models, which are attractive because they 
simultaneously seek to provide authors with incentives to create and a 
just reward for their efforts.168  These models develop complicated 
schemes to simulate a market that can neutrally approximate the 
value of creative works, thus ensuring both that the right work is 
being created169 and the best work is being rewarded.170  They rely on 
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and fulfill the familiar conception of expression as an owned good, for 
which every use should be compensated, even if the good does not 
share the exclusivity of personal property.171 
The second set of models rejects the proposition that society 
should reward authors in direct proportion to the consumption of their 
works.172  Because expression is nonrivalrous, these models view 
creative labor as a service and attempt to find a method to reliably 
compensate authors for their time.173  In a way, while these models 
differ from the romantic ideal of creative production, they provide a 
closer reflection of reality for many creative laborers.174  For many in 
the creative industries, copyright is assigned to an employer or 
commissioner upon its creation—creativity is a service provided for a 
fee.175  Though creative workers are substantially more likely to 
sustain themselves through employment and contract work than by 
becoming famous enough to sell copies of works, fairness in 
mainstream copyright theory remains somewhat star struck.176  The 
idealization of mass-media stars entrenches a view of the author as 
genius, distinct from ordinary laborers, and deserving of reward in 
direct proportion to her popularity.177  Success, in this popular 
meritocratic ideal, really means fame and monopolistic returns, not a 
more modest but more certain fair wage.178 
B. A Better Model of Fairness 
This deep theoretical conflict about the rewards authors are 
morally entitled to opens the possibility of a better model of fairness in 
copyright theory.  Although fairness plays a significant role in 
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copyright discourse, it is significantly underdeveloped.179  Utilitarian 
economic approaches tend to disclaim distributional and noneconomic 
issues in copyright doctrine, while rights theories tend toward a 
conception of fairness that prioritizes authorial control without 
adequately considering the social interest in greater access to cultural 
goods.180  A better model might be to consider cultural policy in terms 
of positive capabilities for human flourishing.181  Before any of the 
nonconsumption-based models can provide a convincing account, they 
must first show that fairness does not require authors to be paid for 
each use of their work.  Shifting our conception of progress opens up 
new ways of looking at rewards for creative labor in this regard.  If 
creativity is ordinary and abundant, fairness to creators might not be 
so prescriptive.  Fairness requires, in a negative sense, that creators 
are not exploited—that others do not unjustly benefit from the fruits 
of their labor.  In a positive sense, it means both that authors must be 
sufficiently free in their creative processes and that professional 
creators are able to earn a dignified living from their work.182 
Viewing creativity as abundant lends weight to a view of fair 
returns based on the time and skill of the professional creative 
laborer.  This view holds true particularly if society dismantles the 
hard distinctions between creative amateurs and professionals, 
employees and solitary geniuses, and creative work and other forms of 
labor.183  The fact that creativity is ordinary and abundant, however, 
should cause doubt that any one model will provide just outcomes in 
all circumstances.184  The ideal of creative labor in copyright theory 
requires an analysis of the rewards that the paradigmatic romantic 
author should be entitled to.  In practice, creators are rewarded in a 
wide variety of ways, both economic and noneconomic.185  Fairness, in 
this conception, is pragmatic; it turns more on the ability of creators to 
 
 179.  Drassinower, supra note 20, at 1869-70.  
 180.  Id. at 1869.  
 181.  MADHAVI SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
GLOBAL JUSTICE 20 (2012); Cohen, supra note 6, at 1159-60; see AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS 
FREEDOM 227, 242 (1999); Martha C. Nussbaum, Foreword, Constitutions and Capabilities: 
“Perception” Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 25 (2007); see also Chon, supra note 
99, at 818-19; Fisher III, supra note 127, at 1463-72. 
 182.  SUNDER, supra note 181, at 95-100 (arguing that fairness includes the capability to 
participate in cultural production, recognition of authorship and vulnerability to exploitation, 
ability to sustain livelihood, and support of non-market-based cultural production). 
 183.  Lunney, Jr., supra note 11, at 610 (arguing that copyright can distort labor markets 
by providing much higher rewards for the production of intangibles than other socially 
productive work). 
 184.  Id. at 649-51.  
 185.  Gordon, supra note 5, at 156-57. 
2013] ACCESS, PROGRESS, AND FAIRNESS 329 
thrive than it does on the particular set of entitlements we choose to 
support creativity.186 
This critical examination of fairness has so far been largely 
missing from various proposals for nonscarce solutions to the  
public-goods problem in copyright.  The alternate-compensation 
models are explicitly rooted in a conception of fairness that mirrors 
the existing market, without fully considering the distributive 
problems that market has created.187  The service-based and 
voluntary-payment proposals tend to focus on efficiency grounds, but 
they generally fail to provide a strong normative account to justify 
business models that reward authors based on their labor and not 
individual acts of access.188  Professor Wendy Gordon’s  
unjust-enrichment model provides the most critical examination of 
what fairness to authors might require, and she focuses on an 
obligation for commercial users to pay authors for the commercial 
benefit they derive from expression.189  Gordon’s model addresses the 
negative sense of fairness—that authors are not exploited—but does 
not attempt to provide a fully fledged examination of whether a 
commercial restitutionary obligation could adequately solve the 
production problem.190 
The first avenue for future research this Article  presents is the 
development of a better model of fairness in the rewards that authors 
deserve for their work.  Proponents of abundance models must further 
explore what fairness consists of and how it can be ensured in both 
negative and positive senses.  In all likelihood, no one solution will be 
able to provide a fully satisfactory answer; in practical terms, a 
combination of different methods of remunerating authors will likely 
be needed for different circumstances.  Importantly, however, any 
potential alternatives to exclusivity must recognize that exclusivity 
plays an important role both in structuring cultural production and in 
providing a normatively accepted means of rewarding authorship. 
VI. THE RATIONAL CONSUMER AND COMMONS MODELS 
Pragmatically, if fairness does rely on the ability of any given 
model to financially support professional authors, the service-based 
and voluntary-payment models face a particularly acute difficulty: 
without the explicit link to consumption, these models embody a 
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higher, and almost fatal, perceived risk of free riding.191  The 
meritocratic assumption that underpins the copyright market ensures, 
tautologically, that successful authors can exploit their works.192  
When payments are delinked from consumption, it is conceivable that 
a widely consumed (“successful”) creative work may not provide 
adequate remuneration for the author.193  Property rules, liability 
rules, and benefit-sharing schemes would ensure that authors are 
paid in some ratio to the consumption of their works, but classical 
economics suggests that any model that relies largely on voluntary 
payments will likely face prohibitive free-riding problems. 
A. What Is “Success”? 
As a first step, proponents of these models may need to change 
their conception of success.  Under more abundant views of creativity, 
success might mean that an author has been able to express herself; 
has been heard by an audience the author desires to engage with; has 
been treated fairly; and, if necessary and desired, has been able to 
raise the funds to cover production costs and secure a fair return on 
the investment.  Unless such a vision of abundant success can 
substantially displace the dominance of the meritocratic mass-media 
superstar, many service-based models will be incapable of 
demonstrating that they are able to reward authorship in a 
sufficiently fair manner. 
If both creativity and success can be viewed as abundant, then 
the next challenge is to demonstrate that any voluntary payment 
model can work at all.  These models must overcome a large hurdle in 
providing a convincing argument that consumers will pay for the 
production of nonexcludable goods.  The consumer in copyright theory 
is predominantly viewed as a classical rational actor; while the 
consumer will pay for valuable services and value-added exclusive 
products, the consumer will almost certainly not support 
crowdfunding or tipping models of production.194  It seems to make no 
sense, through the lens of classical economics, to think that a 
consumer would voluntarily pay for the creation of a work that the 
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consumer knows will be freely accessible if the consumer waits for 
others to pay first. 
This assumption that copyright must coerce rational users in 
order to fund cultural production, like the assumption that the law 
must incentivize creators, is highly suspect.  Professor Yochai Benkler 
points out that, at least where capital costs are relatively low, the 
increased ability of individuals to communicate and organize can allow 
“various provisioning problems to be structured in forms amenable to 
decentralized production based on social relations, rather than 
through markets or hierarchies.”195  There is growing evidence that 
some creators are able to use crowdfunding and other mechanisms to 
leverage the increased potential audience that zero-cost online 
distribution provides into a large array of revenue streams not 
anchored in artificial scarcity.196  At this stage, the question is not 
whether these models work, but whether they can scale upward, both 
in terms of quantity and size.  At least for projects that do not require 
high levels of capital investment, it seems plausible that these types of 
decentralized models can scale upward to fund a substantial 
proportion of professional creators, providing revenues at least 
comparable to the low rewards typically available under the current 
system.  Because these models end up cutting out substantial revenue 
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previously allocated to intermediaries, consumers or creators (or both) 
could in fact be better off than under the current system.197 
B. Commons Models 
Both crowdfunding and peer-production regimes provide a 
commons-based solution to the public-goods problem.  There is a 
longstanding assumption that the lack of excludability in a commons 
leads to underinvestment from the private sector, which is primarily 
addressed by creating property rights or through direct public 
regulation.198  Professor Elinor Ostrom, through a detailed analysis of 
a large set of case studies involving natural-resource commons, has 
demonstrated that in some circumstances, private actors can develop 
complex sets of social norms to effectively manage common-pool 
resources through collective action.199  Crowdfunding schemes, which 
provide methods for private actors to share the costs of creative 
cultural production, are an example of a collective-action solution to 
the problem of coordinating investment in the production of cultural 
works. 
Crowdfunding, as a relatively new phenomenon, at least in its 
modern form, has not been extensively studied.  There is no real 
empirical validation of whether the success stories seen so far are 
outliers or whether these methods can scale to a sufficiently broad 
proportion of cultural production.  There is no real evidence as to 
whether these models can work adequately to support emerging 
artists, as opposed to authors with strong established networks.200  
There is very little evidence about whether nonscarce models work for 
massive cultural production, as opposed to small and midsized 
projects.201  None of these models have yet provided a fully convincing 
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solution to the coordination problem of large-scale cultural production.  
More research is required to identify how to coordinate and fund 
large-scale projects in the absence of the exclusivity that copyright 
provides. 
The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework 
that Ostrom developed to analyze natural-resource commons202 is a 
very promising approach to examining these questions.  Professors 
Madison, Frischmann, and Strandburg have developed a preliminary 
modified IAD framework adapted specifically for “constructed cultural 
commons,” which are “environments for developing and distributing 
cultural and scientific knowledge through institutions that support 
pooling and sharing that knowledge in a managed way.”203  Because 
cultural commons are actually engaged in producing the common 
resource, the cultural commons IAD framework must be more complex 
in the way it considers the resource in the context of attributes and 
rules of the community.204  The IAD framework, as adapted for 
constructed cultural commons, provides a useful analytical model to 
examine crowdfunding case studies.  The framework provides a model 
to interpret producers’ motivations to create and individuals’ decisions 
to fund projects, as well as the outcomes and patterns of interactions 
between participants.  The framework requires explicit examination of 
the characteristics of the cultural work, the attributes of the 
community involved, and the rules in use at multiple levels.205  This 
approach opens up a number of useful inquiries about the way in 
which crowdfunding projects and other commons models operate, the 
factors that influence their success, and the types of projects that they 
can support. 
The promise of commons models is that they offer an approach 
to funding cultural production that does not rely on the trade-offs 
against access (in the exclusive-rights model) or autonomy (in the 
public-funding models).  Particularly, commons models should assist 
in developing a better understanding of the user in terms of both 
access and the ultimate funder of creative production.  Much of 
current copyright discourse attempts to fit creative practice and 
cultural consumption into the model of classical economics.  The 
fundamental assumption that underpins the current copyright reform 
dialectic is that a workable compromise between evolving business 
models and harsher penalties is needed in order to create a 
normatively acceptable commodity market in expression.  Focusing on 
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making cultural output fit the commodity model, however, obscures a 
more fruitful inquiry: whether there are other viable models, not 
based on the opposition of incentives and access, but instead based on 
a symbiotic view of cultural production as an ongoing process and 
dialog between authors and consumers. 
The health of the copyright ecosystem certainly depends on 
users internalizing its goals.  As Professor Litman argues, it “requires 
that members of the public believe that their investment in copyright 
is well spent.”206  The mainstream copyright-reform process seeks to 
drive this normative acceptance by creating a more efficient “celestial 
jukebox”207—a hybrid of simple markets and volume licensing priced 
appropriately with reference to demand and degrees of access.  
Certainly, paradigmatic models like the iTunes Music Store, Steam, 
NetFlix, and Spotify are already driving this sort of normative support 
for exclusivity with business models that provide users with a better 
deal than traditional models.  In the long term, however, achieving 
normative support likely requires more than better business models, 
simpler rules, and bigger sticks.  It requires significantly improving 
the limited level of access that exclusive distribution models 
represent, and visibly reducing the highly inequitable distribution of 
wealth in the creative industries.  It may be that the largest threat to 
a sustainable copyright model is not the ease of massive infringement, 
but the failure of the copyright industry to convince its audience that 
the copyright model represents a fair deal both for artists and for 
consumers.208 
A better model of the user should highlight not only the 
benefits of abundance for learning, expression, and creative play, but 
should more deeply examine the motivations that users have to 
support the production of creative work.  Certainly, users are rational 
consumers in many of their interactions with creative expression.  But 
at other times, users are deeply passionate about creative work, and, 
given an opportunity to connect with the creative process and a reason 
to do so, they will willingly invest in creative production.209  Users—or, 
more accurately, fans—fundamentally want to support artists.  Fans 
develop incredibly strong links to their favorite artists that cannot be 
explained by the simplistic model of the rational consumer.  It is 
possible that a more sustainable ecosystem could directly involve fans 
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in the funding model and, in return, could provide all users with the 
benefits that expressive abundance promises.  The mainstream 
copyright reform dialectic is struggling to maintain legitimacy and 
normative support from users for a system rooted in artificial scarcity 
that seems increasingly at odds with the abundance the Internet has 
been able to deliver.  Perhaps it is possible, even if it seems irrational, 
to instead create a system that provides more abundance and 
distributively fairer rewards in order to support an alternative social 
norm that users should voluntarily choose to support the artists whose 
work they enjoy.  Either way, social norms may need to shift, but 
there is no guarantee that exclusivity backed by threats of 
punishment will be more acceptable than abundance backed by a 
direct relationship between creators and fans. 
Not all users feel so strongly about the creators of expression 
they use and reuse that they will help fund its production.  The 
question is whether there are enough fans who do care to fairly 
subsidize the costs of production.  More accurately, the question is 
likely whether enough creators are able to cultivate the personal 
relationships with their fans necessary to convince those fans to 
support the creators’ next project.  Any model based on voluntary 
payments will require creators to be much more involved with their 
audiences (whether directly or through an agent); the creators who are 
successful without artificial scarcity will likely be the creators who are 
able to connect to their audiences and deliver a service that is 
sufficiently popular to justify its expense.  These models much more 
directly put control over creative production in the hands of artists 
and fans, rather than requiring producers to make educated guesses 
about what types of content will sell.  Ideally, an enhanced dialogue 
between artists and fans could lead to more variety in the projects 
that receive funding and more value created in the goods and services 
that creators offer to their fans.  This disintermediation could provide 
efficiency gains by limiting the huge investments in marketing and 
large rents required to support the massively inefficient hits and 
misses of the mass-media model.210  At the very least, society should 
critically examine these voluntary payment- and service-based models.  
It is no longer clear that users will rationally refuse to support the 
production of works they enjoy.  It is possible that new models may 
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arise that create a sustainable cultural environment based on real 
symbiotic relationships between creators and users. 
C. A Better Compensation Model 
Systems based on voluntary payments and crowdfunding, 
however, are unlikely to be able to provide a complete and fair 
solution to copyright’s production problem.  A better model of 
creativity and consumption in copyright may reveal some distinctions 
between categories of both users and works that are not amenable to 
disintermediated-funding models.  As a first pass, it will probably be 
necessary to account at least for commercial users for whom 
consumption and reuse will likely be predominantly rational.  Firms 
that depend on creative expression not for its intrinsic value, but for 
its commercial benefits, might be significantly more likely to free ride 
off of existing expression, and there is a strong argument that 
unrestrained commercial free riding could amount to harmful 
exploitation.211  In such circumstances, some level of exclusivity or 
liability-rule obligation might remain necessary to deal with 
commercial users.212  There may also be forms of expression that are 
basically fungible, like stock photography, whose creators are 
generally unable to develop sustainable relationships with audiences 
in order to fund a sufficient amount of cultural production.  For these 
forms, either advertiser-funded production or levy-based  
alternate-compensation models might represent the best alternatives 
to an exclusive marketplace.  Another set of creative practices could be 
too marginal to find stable support but too valuable to submit to the 
vagaries of the market, and for these, society could choose to use 
public grant programs to fund their production.213  Many such cultural 
forms, like symphony or opera, are extremely expensive and currently 
depend to a large degree on public or philanthropic support. 
The critical point is that there is no reason to adopt a  
one-size-fits-all model that assumes that large-scale commercial 
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producers share the same motivations as artistically motivated 
authors, or that fans will voluntarily pay for access no more than will 
rational investors. The second avenue for future research that this 
Article presents is the need for better empirical examination of the 
extent to which nonscarce models are workable and scalable.  This 
research should try to develop a substantially better understanding of 
the types of situations and projects that are amenable to crowdfunding 
and other nonscarce business models; the characteristics and 
experiences of authors with successful and unsuccessful experiments; 
and the complex web of factors that influence users to support or not 
support various projects. 
VII. NONCOMMERCIAL ASPECTS OF FAIRNESS 
A. Traditional Conceptions of Authorial Harm 
Because mainstream copyright theory has largely obscured 
fairness, more exploration into the other aspects of fairness that 
exclusivity currently supports is necessary.214  Again, most attempts to 
address the public-goods-production problem from an economic 
perspective fail to take into account the ways in which exclusivity 
protects nonpecuniary interests of authors.  These approaches 
therefore are vulnerable to criticisms that they will lead to 
exploitation of authors, even if they adequately address the  
incentives-reward problem.  Any attempt to limit the exclusivity of 
copyright must seriously consider whether and how to fill the gap that 
would be left in terms of authorial control over expression.215 
There are hard questions about authorial control and, in 
particular, integrity, that do not have answers rooted in efficiency.  
Commercial exploitation is an important example; an efficiency-based 
approach to creative production would suggest that once an author 
has been paid for her creative services, no further permission or 
payment is necessary when her work is reused.  But this does not fully 
answer the question of fairness or harm.  It is plausible that unwanted 
commodification of creative expression could harm the author’s 
personality interest in controlling the integrity of the author’s work,216 
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or that an author could feel that a commercial user who exploits a 
work to financial advantage owes the author some duty to account.217 
The interests that Continental moral rights protect pose 
similar dilemmas.  It seems simple to suggest that authors have a 
serious enough interest in integrity in their works that society should 
grant them a presumptive power to prevent premature or unwanted 
publication.218  Other questions are more difficult.  For example, the 
extent to which authors should have a right to prevent derogatory 
treatments of their works is an important and unresolved tension.  
This tension is most evident in the conflict between Anglo-American 
copyright law and Continental copyright law, which explicitly provides 
moral rights protection.219 
Mainstream copyright theory struggles with a dual view of 
authorial control.  Copyright’s explicit utilitarian overtures suggest 
that copyright is not at all concerned with authors’ rights, and that 
moral rights have no major place in US copyright doctrine.220  At the 
same time, however, exclusivity provides authors with an extremely 
powerful ability to control the use of their expression.221  In this way, 
not only does copyright’s exclusivity support a liberal solution to the 
question of value, it supports a liberal solution to the subjectivity of 
potential harm.  Copyright law provides authors with a  
property-based contractual method to structure their own relations in 
a way that maximizes their autonomy and avoids forcing the state to 
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determine difficult questions of what types of actions should be 
considered harmful.222 
B. Broader Conceptions of Authorial Harm 
More research to investigate the harms that can result from a 
lack of strong exclusive rights could help inform the development of 
abundance models.  The conjunction of economic and rights theories in 
requiring exclusivity supports a general presumption that 
unauthorized access is harmful, unless specifically excused.  This 
proposition is, as Professor Wendy Gordon points out, “drastically 
overbroad”;223 a view of culture as interdependent requires recognizing 
that “the potential free riders—the users, copyists, and adapters—are 
not mere parasites.”224  A better conception of harm would instead 
consider the legitimate interests of authors within a social context.225  
In a world where creativity is abundant, expression is nonrivalrous, 
and authors create more out of desire and compulsion than a rational 
decision to engage in difficult labor, it might not make sense to view 
harm in the acts of sharing, consumption, learning, and creative play, 
at least in relation to works made publicly available. 
A more particularized view of harm might instead focus on the 
acts of users of creative expression—whether the user releases it 
before the creator is ready, fails to give proper attribution, subjects it 
to derogatory treatment, or unfairly commercially exploits it.  Little 
consensus exists in the United States as to what degree of control 
authors should be entitled to, but without this consensus, critiques of 
exclusivity that focus only on the economic public-goods problem will 
likely continue to struggle to find normative support. 
Fairness requires that creators are still able to flourish and 
thrive, and this probably entails some sort of control over expression, 
but it is by no means clear that a monolithic property right is 
necessarily the best method to protect authorial interests.  
Interestingly, these debates have been playing out in miniature over 
the last two decades in the free-software and free-culture 
communities, where participants have been shaping contractual 
solutions to lessen exclusivity but protect certain personal and 
economic authorial interests.  Many different licenses attempt to 
strike subtly different bargains, and the normative superiority of each 
is often hotly contested.  The most permissive licenses allow unlimited 
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distribution and modification and mainly impose a requirement of 
attribution.226  Some licenses include clauses designed to protect 
authorial integrity by forbidding all modifications.227  A particularly 
popular clause in the Creative Commons licenses prohibits all 
commercial use, requiring commercial users to seek explicit 
permission, and potentially pay appropriate license fees.228  Free 
software advocates—who place significant value on the ability to 
modify and use without discrimination—view both of these 
restrictions with particular hostility.229  Many users of both  
free-software licenses and free-culture licenses seek to protect 
themselves from unfair exploitation in another way: by requiring any 
modifications to their original work to be released back to the public 
under similar terms.230  These “copyleft” licenses effectively restrict 
commercial and noncommercial users from free riding and 
appropriating the benefits of the work of others, while still allowing 
nondiscriminatory use by those willing to contribute to the communal 
efforts. 
The proliferation of different types of open licenses highlights 
the diversity of ways in which authors view potential harm to their 
works.  Each of these different licenses reflects a particular conception 
of harm, and it is only by building on copyright’s exclusive rights that 
the licenses are able to strike a balance between access and integrity 
with which the author is comfortable.231  The fierceness of the debate 
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in free-software and free-culture communities about the acceptability 
of different restrictions indicates that it may be particularly difficult 
to identify a core set of authorial interests that ought to be universally 
protected or protectable in the absence of exclusivity in copyright 
generally.  The liberal approach that copyright currently takes, by 
making exclusivity the default and allowing ad hoc contractual 
variations, certainly has its advantages. 
The final avenue for research that this Article raises is the 
need for a better understanding of authorial control and harm. In 
particular, copyright theory needs to address the normative question 
of whether authors’ apprehensions of harm are entirely 
heterogeneous, or whether the law can develop common 
understandings of potential harm in such a way that harm can be 
minimized without fully exclusive rights.  It may be possible to 
achieve a desirable result by following a Continental moral rights 
approach and establishing personal rights that protect against specific 
forms of harm.  Such rights could grant various entitlements, 
potentially including requirements of attribution, protection of 
integrity, and benefit sharing or veto rights for commercial uses.  
Whether any such set of entitlements could be comprehensive, 
acceptable, and still provide for a substantial degree of free access, 
however, remains an unanswered question.  More research is needed 
to examine what forms of noneconomic harm authors should have a 
right to object to.  So far, Anglo-American copyright theory has not 
needed to confront this question directly. Without some consensus 
about the personal interests copyright should protect, however, the 
highly subjective nature of potential harm is likely to pose fatal 
problems for abundance models. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The opposition of utilitarian and rights theories in copyright 
firmly entrenches the incentives-access paradigm.  Together, these 
approaches dominate mainstream theoretical copyright discourse, 
reinforcing the continued necessity of exclusivity.  Too much of the 
copyright-reform debate is bound up in a search for ideological purity 
or an empirical quest to find the appropriate balance between 
incentives and access.232  Thinking of copyright as a necessary balance 
between the rights of authors and the interests of the public precludes 
some more fundamental critiques that aim to investigate whether 
society can realize the goals of the copyright system without the most 
harmful effects of exclusivity.  Instead, we need a critical theory to 
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escape the perpetual opposition of utilitarian-economic and  
authors-rights approaches.233 
A view of progress that foregrounds access to expression, 
cultural flow, and the ordinariness of creativity opens up the 
possibility that culture is not zero sum—that increases in access do 
not have to come at the expense of the creation of new works.  
Through this reconstituted view of progress, a new model can identify 
the specific functions that the exclusive rights play and the harms 
they try to avoid.  Critically questioning the continued necessity of 
exclusivity requires disentangling and directly addressing at least 
three distinct issues that have long been bound up in copyright’s 
differing ideological justifications.  First, a better model of what 
fairness requires in terms of remuneration and reward for creative 
labor is necessary.  This point is crucial to any discussion of the 
normative desirability of alternate-compensation schemes and 
nonexclusive funding models for the creative industries.  Second, 
copyright theorists should develop a better empirical understanding of 
whether commons models and other pragmatic solutions to the public 
goods problem can convincingly provide adequate support to 
professional creators to enable the continued production of a 
sufficiently diverse culture.  Third, it is necessary to identify when, in 
what contexts, and to what extent exclusivity may be required to fairly 
protect the nonpecuniary interests of authors.  Models of abundance in 
cultural expression provide great promise, but until proponents can 
address each of these issues, any critique of exclusivity is likely to fail. 
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